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OHIO V CLARK: THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE MANDATORY
REPORTING PROVISIONS & CHILD TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT
IN RELATION TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Eun Ji, Kim1
1. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "i all criminal prosecitions, the ac-
Cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confront-
ed with the witnesses against him ."'M Under
the pre-CraifoJrd rubric of Ohio V. Roberts, the
Un ited States Supreme Court initerpreted the
Confrontation Clause to admit a hearsay state-
ment made by an una vailable witness if the
statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliabil-
ity.'" 2 In other words, the Court required the
out-of-court statement to either "fall:] within
a firmly rooted hearsay ex(eption" or contain
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
In 2004, the Supreme Court radically
changed its approach to the Clauise and over-
ruled the Roberts substance-based test.4 In
Crafo ird v. MIaishillgtonl, the Court declared that
"tie Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reli-
ability of evidence. but it is a procedural rath-
t .S. Const. arnend. V1.
2 OIio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56. 66 (1980).
Idfsee also ,illyv. Virginia527US 116 124-25
(1999) (plurality opinion) (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66)
("I]t contains 'particularized guarantees of trustwlorthi-
ness' such that adversarial testing would be expected
to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability.");
Ann Hetherwick Puniphrey, Admissibility ofHearsay
.Statenents to Police: Davis v. Washington and HaninIon v.
Indiana. BosToN BJ 17 (2006, (stating that "the excited
utterance exception generally used in domestic violence
cases" could be an examiplc of a firtI rooted hearsay
exception").
See Crawford v.Wasihigtoii. 541 U.S. 36. 62 (2004).
er than a sulbstantive guarantee."5 The Roberts
substance -based test allowed a jury to hear
an oit-of-court statement once a court deter-
mtine(d that it was reliable regar(less of whether
there had been a prior opportunity for cross
examination of the witness offering testimony
as to the statement.6 In contrast, the Crawfolrd
procedure-based test prohibits the admission
of a testimonial hearsay statement by a nontes-
tifying witness, unless the witness is unavail-
able, and a defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.7 Tius, the Craw-jord test acts irrespective of the statement's in-
dicia of reliabilit,
Not all hearsay statements are subject
to the Confrontation Claise, bitt a testirnoni-
al statement is subject to the Confrontation
Clause." In Crawford, although the Court de-
fined "testimtonv" as "a solernt declaration or
affirmation made fr the purpose of establish-
ing or proving some fact , "' it failed to provide
a comtprehensive definition of a testimonial
statement. o Two years after Crfior/d, in Dacis
- Craw ford v Nkashington, 54 1 1US. at 61.
SConpare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56, with Craw-
ford v.Aashington. 541 U.S. at 53.
Id.
* Crawford v N ashington, 541 1S. at 51.
Id. (citation ornitted).
10 Ohio v. Clark. 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 2015 '"Our deci-
sion in Crawjfiord did not offer an exhaustive definition
of "testimonial" statements. Instead, Cra."ford stated
that the label "applies at a nuinun to prior testinony
at a preliminary hearing. before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations.").
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v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Su-
preme Court set forth the primary purpose test
to further elucidate what it means for a state-
ment to be labeled "testimonial."n The Court
explained:
Statements are nontestimoni-
al when made in the course of
police interrogation under cir-
cumstances objectively indicat-
ing that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an on-
going emergency. They are testi-
monial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there
is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prose-
cution. 12
The primary purpose test applies solely
to a statement given to law enforcement officers;
the Supreme Court remained silent on the is-
sue of a similar statement offered to individuals
who are not law enforcement officers until its
2015 decision in Ohio v. Clark." Moreover, even
though the Court had previously attempted
to further clarify the primary purpose test by
requiring consideration of "all of the relevant
circumstances," it had not explicitly addressed
the matter of a declarant's age in determining a
testimonial statement until Ohio c. Clark."
11 See Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
12 Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. at 822.
13 See Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Ohio v.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 (2015) (noting that because
prior cases involved statements to law enforcement of-
ficers, the Court "reserved the question whether similar
statements to individuals other than law enforcement
officers would raise similar issues under the Confronta-
tion Clause").
14 Michigan v Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011).
The significance of Ohio v,. Clark is that
it clarifies, for the first time, how to consider
the primary purpose of a non-law enforcement
individual who receives a statement and the
age of a victim who made the statement when
evaluating a challenged statement.1 5 This article
first explores Ohio v. Clark in light of its back-
ground and the Court's legal analysis. Next, it
discusses why Ohio v. Clark renders itself sig-
nificant on the issue of the principal purpose of
a non-law enforcement individual's interview
with a child victim, and recommends a possi-
ble way to determine a non-law enforcement
individual's purpose in a given interview and
assistance provided to a child victim. It then
describes what social science research has told
us about how a victim's age affects his or her
cognitive and perceptive abilities.
2. OHIO V. CLARK
2.1. Factual and Procedural Background
Darius Clark lived with his girlfriend
who was a mother of two: her three-year-old
son, L.P, and her eighteen-month-old daugh-
ter, A.T.16 When his girlfriend went out of state
to work as a prostitute, Clark agreed to care for
L.P. and A.T.o
In March 2010, when the two children
were in Clark's care, one of L.P.'s preschool
teachers noticed that his eye was "bloodshot.""
When she questioned him about his blood-
stained eye, L.P. told his teacher that he fell."
When they moved from the lunchroom to a
classroom which had better lights, the teach-
'5 Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
16 Id. at 2178.
17 Id. at 2177-78.
1 Id. at 2178.
19 Id
62 WAfashington College of Law Spring 2016 2
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er found additional "red marks" on L.P.'s face.20
After being notified by the teacher, the lead
teacher asked L.P who did it and what hap-
pened to him. 2 1 L.P. replied: "Dee, Dee." 22 "Dee"
turned out to be a nickname by which Clark
went. 23 The lead teacher took L.P. to her super-
visor.24 When the supervisor found more bruis-
es and other injuries on L.P's body, they called
a child abuse hotline to report to authorities
the possibility of abuse.5
Later, Clark arrived at the preschool to
pick up L P. 26 He denied responsibility of the
bruises and injuries on the boy's body.27 On fur-
ther investigation, a social worker took both of
Clark's girlfriend's children to a hospital where
a physician discovered more injuries not only
on L.P. but also on his sister.2 8
Before trial, L.E was ruled incompetent
to testify due to his age.29 Under Ohio law, a
witness under ten years old is generally barred
from testifying if he or she "appear[s] incapable
of receiving just impressions of the facts and
transactions respecting which they are exam-
ined, or of relating them truly." 0 In other words,
L.P. would be prohibited from testifying unless
he showed that he was able to understand the
difference between truth and falsity and appre-
ciate his responsibility to be truthful."
20 Id.
21 Id
22 Id.
23 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2177-78.
24 Id. at 2178.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (stating that the boy had "a black eye, belt marks
on his back and stomach, and bruises all over his body";
the girl had "two black eyes, a swollen hand, and a large
burn on her cheek, and two pigtails had been ripped
out at the roots of her hair").
29 Id
0 Ohio R. Evid. 601(A) (Lexis 2015).
See generally State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St. 3d 247, 251
(Ohio 1991) (enumerating five factors that a trial court
At trial, the judge decided that L.P. was
not competent to testify. But one of the hear-
say exceptions under Ohio Rule of Evidence
allows the admission of a child's out-of-court
statement in an abuse case.3 2 Consequent-
ly, over the defense attorney's objection, the
judge allowed the State to introduce testimony
from the teachers who had talked with L.P. and
heard his statements about the alleged abuse
by Clark."
Clark moved to exclude this evidence
under the Confrontation Clause, but the court
denied his motion on the ground that L.E's
hearsay statements were not testimonial and
so were not covered by the Clause." The jury
found Clark guilty and sentenced him to twen-
ty-eight years' imprisonment. 5 The state ap-
pellate court reversed his conviction on the
ground that L.E's hearsay statements were tes-
timonial and thus covered by the Sixth Amend-
ment.3 6 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed."'
It held that there was no ongoing emergency,
and that under the state mandatory reporting
law, the teachers were acting as agents of law
enforcement." Thus, the court found their pri-
mary purpose of questioning was "gather[ing]
evidence potentially relevant to a subsequent
criminal prosecution."" In reaching its conclu-
sion on the issue of whether this was a testimo-
must consider in determining whether a child witness
under ten is competent to testify: "the child's ability to
receive accurate impressions of fact," "the child's ability
to recollect those impressions," "the child's ability to
communicate what was observed," the child's ability to
understand "truth and falsity," and "the child's appreci-
ation of his or her responsibility to be truthful").
32 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178; OHIO R. EVID.
807.
3 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.
34 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id
37 Id.
" State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d 346, 347 (Ohio 2013).
39 Id. at 350.
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nial statement, the court did not consider or
mention L.P.'s age and his primary purpose of
revealing the abuser's name.4 0
2.2. Legal Analysis
The United States Supreme Court held
that the trial court's decision to allow the ad-
mission of L.P.'s out-of-court statements did
not violate the Confrontation Clause. In ren-
dering its judgment under the primary pur-
pose test, the Court considered five factors to
determine "whether statements to persons oth-
er than law enforcement officers are subject to
the Confrontation Clause."4 In this section, all
of the five factors are discussed in the order the
Court considered them in its opinion.4 3 Follow-
ing a brief analysis of the five factors, the next
two sections offer an in-depth examination of
the fifth and third factors, successively.
First of all, the Court concluded that
L.P's statements were made in the context of
an ongoing emergency implicating suspect-
ed child abuse. Unlike the Supreme Court
of Ohio, which found that there was no ongo-
ing emergency because L.P. did not complain
about his injuries, and the nature of the teach-
ers' questions suggested a purpose to establish
facts of potential child abusive activities and to
identify the abuser, the Court pointed out sev-
eral facts of the case to explain why it found
the existence of the ongoing emergency at the
time of L.P.'s statements. The Court said that
the teachers' "immediate concern was to pro-
tect a vulnerable child" in that they were not
o See id. (never mentioning L.P's age in its analysis of
the case).
41 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
42 Id. at 2181.
11 See Id. at 2181-82.
11 Id. at 2181.
5 Compare State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d at 352, with
Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
certain if it would be safe to release the boy
to Clark, his guardian, at the end of the day;
the circumstances were not clear to the teach-
ers; and the teachers' inquiries were meant to
identify the abuser to protect L.P. from future
attacks.46 Accordingly, the Court found that the
boy's statements were offered in the context of
the ongoing emergency.
Second, the Court brought attention to
the nature of the conversation between L.P. and
his teachers, which was "informal and spon-
taneous." The Court stated that his teachers
queried L.P about his injuries in the preschool
lunchroom and classroom but not in a place
like a "formalized station-house."4 The Court
also pointed out that the teachers "did so pre-
cisely as any concerned citizen would talk to
a child who might be the victim of abuse."'9
Therefore, the nature of the conversation in
this case implied that it was held informally
rather than formally.50
Third, while the Supreme Court of Ohio
did not take L.P's age into account, the United
States Supreme Court viewed L.P.'s age as an
indication that neither L.P nor his teachers had
the primary purpose of establishing evidence
for the prosecution." Because few preschool
students like L.P. appreciate "the details of [the]
criminal justice system," the Court found that
a three-year-old boy in L.P.'s situation would
46 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
1 Compare State v. Clark, 137 Ohio St. 3d at 349-55
(finding that the teachers were acting as agents of law
enforcement and that there was lack of an ongoing
emergency to support its conclusion that L.P.'s state-
ments were testimonial), witi Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at
2181-82 (2015).
64 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
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have not intended his answers to his teachers
to be "a substitute for trial testimony." 52
Fourth, the Court cited common law
history." It referred to eighteenth century Lon-
don, where courts "tolerated flagrant hearsay .
. . involving a child victim who was not compe-
tent to testify because she was too young to ap-
preciate the significance of her oath."5 ' Because
the Court has recognized that the Confronta-
tion Clause does not bar the admission of out-
of-court statements that would have been ad-
missible in a criminal case "at the time of the
founding," L.P's statements were not prohibit-
ed by the Sixth Amendment. 5
The Court finally gave some guidance to
lower courts on the issue of a statement provid-
ed to individuals who are not law enforcement
officers.56 The Court ruled that although it
would not adopt a categorical rule on this mat-
ter, it believed that the identity of the questioner
and the relationship between people involved
in the challenged conversation is important.
Moreover, the Court stated that statements of-
fered to a person who does not have a princi-
pal duty to discover potential criminal acts are
"significantly less likely to be testimonial than
statements given to law enforcement officers."
Hence, as the relationship between L.P. and the
questioners was that of student-and-teacher,
the Court found that the introduction of L.P.'s
hearsay statements into evidence did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause."
52 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
53 Id.
6 Id. (citation omitted).
55 Id. at 2 176.
56 See Id. at 2182.
57 Id.
58 Id.
5 See Id. (explaining that the identity of the questioner
and a student-teacher relationship should be consid-
ered as one of the circumstantial factors in determining
the primary purpose of the conversation).
3. NON-LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
WHO HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO REPORT6o
WA/hen assessing challenged statements
in context, the Supreme Court stated that "part
of context is the questioner's identity," and
concluded that L.P and the questioners' rela-
'o See generally Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1.143, 1162
(2011). (noting that the primary purpose test implicates
not only the declarant's primary purpose in making
statements but also the questioner's primary purpose in
asking the declarant queries). The Court admitted that
its approach was somewhat complicated, however, the
Court justified the complexity of its approach as neces-
sitated by its unwillingness "to sacrifice accuracy for
simplicity." Id. Therefore, from the Court's perspective,
in order to enhance the accuracy of the primary pur-
pose assessment, "consulting all relevant information,
including the statements and actions of interrogators"
is necessary. Id. Butsee Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[t]he only virtue of the Court's approach .
. . is that it leaves judges free to reach the 'fairest' result
under the totality of the circumstances"). Justice Scalia
also criticized the majority holding, noting that "[i]f the
defendant 'deserves' to go to jail, then a court can focus
on whatever perspective is necessary to declare damn-
ing hearsay nontestimonial. And when all else fails,
a court can mix and match perspectives to reach its
desired outcome."Id. In Crawford, the Court defined a
testimonial statement as "a solemn declaration or affir-
mation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51. A
prima facie reading of the Court's definition demon-
strates that the purpose at issue is that of the individual
who made the statement. The author agrees in part with
the majority and in part with Justice Scalia. The author
believes that because the statement is made by the
declarant, his or her primary purpose should be given
greater weight than that of the questioner. Nevertheless,
the primary purpose of the questioner must be consid -
ered in determining the motive of the declarant since
the primary purpose test requires consideration of all of
the relevant circumstances. Stated differently, the fun-
damental difference between the Court's determination
of whether a statement is testimonial and that proposed
by the author is that under the Court's approach, the
primary purpose of both the declarant and questioner/
listener should be considered, and in deciding their
primary purpose all the relevant circumstances must be
examined, whereas the author's view is that the declar-
ant's primary purpose must be weighed more heavily
than others and in deciding his or her primary purpose,
all the relevant circumstances including the questioner/
listener's primary purpose should be assessed
Washington College of Law 65Spring 2016 5
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tionship was that of a student-and-teacher.61 In
other words, in contrast to a law enforcement
officer, a teacher making queries of her student
does not have a principal duty to discover and
prosecute criminal acts, especially when there
was an ongoing emergency and an urgent con-
cern to protect a vulnerable child. 2
In this evaluation, the Court discussed
the teacher's mandatory reporting obligation
briefly in rebutting Clark's argument that un-
der Ohio law ("the Safe Havens Law"), the
teachers had a duty to report suspected abuse
to appropriate authorities, which in turn made
them act as agents of state law enforcement, so
they should be treated like the police.63 Clark's
position was accepted by the Supreme Court
of Ohio:
At the time [the teacher]
questioned L.P., she acted as
an agent of the state for pur-
poses of law enforcement be-
cause at a minimum, teachers
act in at least a dual capaci-
ty, fulfilling their obligations
both as instructors and also
as state agents to report sus-
pected child abuse pursuant
to [the Safe Havens Law],
which exposes them to lia-
bility if they fail to fulfill this
mandatory duty.64
61 Ohio v Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2182-83.
61 State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Oh. 2013). Ohio
law requires professionals including teachers and
school authorities to report suspected child abuse and
neglect to the public children services agency, a inu-
nicipal, or county peace officer when he or she knows
or suspects that a child has suffered mental or physical
injury that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the
child. Oino Rv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421.
However, the United States Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the decision of
Ohio's highest court by stating that "mandatory
reporting statutes alone cannot convert a con-
versation between a concerned teacher and her
student into a law enforcement mission aimed
primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecu-
tion.""
The Court's ruling concurs with the leg-
islative intent of all state statutes that impose
a mandatory reporting duty upon certain indi-
viduals-professionals and/or other persons
who are not law enforcement officers. 6 None of
the fifty states' laws describe the primary policy
of mandatory obligation as criminal prosecu-
tion; indeed, the purpose of mandatory report-
ing statutes is and should be considered child
61protection.
Although the Court did not explicitly
discuss a legislative scheme of the Safe Havens
Law in its decision, looking at the legislative
intent would be one of the important ways to
address an issue of a testimonial statement un-
der the Confrontation Clause. This approach is
consistent with the Court's 2009 decision ofMe-
lendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.6 In Melendez-Diaz,
the Court held that affidavits of a state labora-
tory analyst who did not testify at a drug tri-
al violated the accused's right under the Sixth
Amendment to confront the witnesses against
him in that under the state law "the sole purpose
of the affidavits was to provide prima facie ev-
idence of the composition, quality, and the net
weight of the analyzed substance."69 Therefore,
69 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
6 See infra notes 75, 80, and text accompanying notes
87-88.
6 See infra notes 75, 80, and text accompanying notes
87-88.
" See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
311 (2009).
69 Id (citation omitted).
66 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
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the Court, in Melendez-Diaz, explicitly consid-
ered and respected the legislative scheme of
the state statute in addressing the testimonial
nature of challenged statements, in that case an
affidavit, under the Confrontation Clause. 0
As the Court has previously recognized,
a legislative policy behind mandatory reporting
statutes can serve a crucial role in determining
whether an out-of-court statement made pur-
suant to a state statute is testimonial. Thus, an
in-depth analysis of each state law that man-
dates either professionals or the general public
to report suspected child maltreatment is high-
ly relevant in determining whether the purpose
of questions made by a teacher is to investigate
and gather evidence for prosecution.
All fifty states have adopted mandato-
ry reporting statutes imposing a duty on cer-
tain individuals to report possible child abuse
to appropriate state authorities if they suspect
or have reason to believe that a child has been
abused or neglected." Although these statutes
vary in who has such an obligation,72 in the
types of state authorities which receive the re-
port and take appropriate action, in procedures
as to the time to report and the disclosure of the
70 Id.
" CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2014) [here-
inafter CHILDVELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY[, https://
wwwchildwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf (stating that
"[a]ll states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands have statutes identifying persons
who are required to report suspected child maltreat-
ment . . ." For the purpose of this article, fifty states'
statutes are discussed).
72 See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAYsupra note
71 at 1-2 (noting that eighteen states require "any per-
son" to report possible child abuse whereas forty-eight
states mandate certain groups of professionals such as
social workers, teachers, physicians, or commercial film
or photograph processors to report).
reporter's identity," and in standards of making
a report such as reporter's suspicion of, knowl-
edge of, or actual observation of latent child
abuse," they all share, explicitly or implicitly,
the legislative policy of protecting maltreated
children.5 The mandatory reporting statutes of
the fifty states can be divided into three catego-
ries: (1) states whose explicit primary concern
is to protect a child's health, safety, and welfare,
(2) states that place child's protection as one
of many purposes of the statute, and (3) states
which do not explicitly declare their policy.
First, there are twenty-one states that
articulate the paramount concern and primary
legislative intent of their mandatory reporting
statutes as protecting "children whose health
and welfare may be adversely affected through
abuse and neglect."" Like Ohio v. Clark, when
" See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note
71, at 4 (explaining that "[a]ll jurisdictions have provi-
sions in statute to maintain the confidentiality of abuse
and neglect record," but only thirty-nine states specifi-
cally protect the identity of the reporters). Compare ALA.
CODE § 26-14-3 and TEX. Emx. CODE § 261.101 (in gener-
al, a child abuse mandatory reporting statute requires
an immediate report to appropriate authorities), with
IDAHO CODE § 16-1605 andVT. ANN. STAT. Tit. 33, § 4911
(requiring a report within twenty-four hours).
" See Child Welfzre Information Gateway, supra note 71
at 3.
- See infra notes 77?, 80, and text accompanying notes
87-88.
16 See infra notes 77? 80, 87-88.
" ALA. CODE § 26-14-2; see abo CAL. PEN. CODE §
11164(b) ("The intent and purpose of this article is to
protect children from abuse and neglect."); COLO. REv.
STAT. §19-3-302 ("[I]t is the intent of the general as-
sembly to protect the best interests of children of this
state and to offer protective services in order to prevent
any further harm to a child suffering from abuse.");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 901 ("The child welfare policy
of this State shall serve to advance the best interests
and secure the safety of the child, while preserving
the family unit whenever the safety of the child is not
jeopardized."); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 ("At all times the
health and safety of the child shall be the primary con-
cern."); IOWA CODE § 232.67 ("It is purpose and policy.
. . to provide the greatest possible protection to victims
or potential victims of abuse through encouraging the
Washington College of Law 67Spring 2016
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the issue is whether a hearsay statement is sub-
increased reporting of suspected cases of abuse .... ")
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2201(b) ("The code shall be lib-
erally construed to carry out the policies of the state
which are to [c]onsider the safety and welfare of a child
to be paramount in all proceedings under the code
. ."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.101, 620.010 ("The
Commonwealth shall direct its efforts to promoting
protection of children"); LA. CHILD'S CODE ART. 601
("The purpose of this Title is to protect children . .
." and [t]his Title is intended to provide the greatest
possible protection as promptly as possible for such
children. The health, safety, and best interest of the
child shall be the paramount concern . . . ."); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, § 4003 ("[T]he health and safety of children
must be of paramount concern . . . ."); MAss. ANN. LAWs
ch. 119, § 1 ("The health and safety of the child shall
be of paramount concern ... ."); MINN. ANN. STAT. §
626.556, subd. 1. ("[T]be public policy of this state is to
protect children . . ." and "the health and safety of the
children shall be of paramount concern."); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-710.01 ("The Legislature declares that
the public policy of the State of Nebraska is to protect
children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized
by abuse or neglect."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:2
("It is the purpose of this chapter, through the manda-
tory reporting of suspected instances of child abuse or
neglect, to provide protection to children whose life,
health or welfare is endangered . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8:8 ("The purpose of this act is to provide for the
protection of children under 18 years of age who have
had serious injury inflicted upon them by other than
accidental means."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01
("The Section . . . shall be liberally interpreted and
construed so as to effectuate the following purposes []
[t]o provide for the case, protection ... of children ...
"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-8A-1 ("It is the purpose of
this chapter to establish an effective state and local sys-
tem for protection of children from abuse or neglect.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-402 ("The purpose of this part
is to protect children whose physical or mental health
and welfare are adversely affected by brutality, abuse
or neglect by requiring reporting of suspected cases
by any person having cause to believe that such case
exists."); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.010 ("[T]he Washing-
ton state legislature hereby provides for the reporting
of [child abuse] cases to the appropriate public author-
ities . . ." and "[i]t is intent of the legislature that, as a
result of such reports, protective services shall be made
available in an effort to prevent further abuse, and to
safeguard the general welfare of such children."); Wis.
Stat. § 48.01 ("[T]he paramount goal of this chapter is to
protect children . . . ."); WVyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-201 ("The
child's health, safety and welfare shall be of paramount
concern in implementing and enforcing this article.").
ject to the Confrontation Clause, a court must
determine the primary purpose of the teach-
ers' queries "by objectively evaluating the state-
ments and actions of the parties . . . in light of
the circumstances in which the [conversation]
occur[red]."'8 As held in Melendez-Diaz, one of
the numerous circumstances can be the pur-
pose of the statute which creates the duty to re-
port and impose that duty on certain persons. 9
Therefore, in the twenty-one states
where the principal legislative intent is protec-
tion of abused children, the statutory mandato-
ry reporting obligation would indeed support
the Court's position that the L.P.'s teachers'
"immediate concern was to protect a vulner-
able child who needed help."" This argument
is rather strong because the primary purpose
test requires a court to examine circumstances
objectively." Accordingly, if a teacher questions
her student in order to clarify if the student
has been abused, the teacher is acting pursu-
ant to the relevant statute. From an objective
perspective, the teacher's primary efforts to ful-
fill her duty are equivalent to acting consistent
with the paramount concern and policy of the
statute which enforces that duty: Protecting
abused children.
Second, twenty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia enumerate numerous pur-
poses simultaneously, including the intent of
child's protection, in their mandatory report-
ing statutes.82 For example, Alaska's law states
three purposes:
71 Michigan v Bryant, 562 U.S. at 370; see also Ohio v.
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
1 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
80 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
1 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2009); See also
supra note 10.
12 See Alaska Stat. § 47.17.010; Ark. Code Ann. §
12-18-102; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101(a); D.C. Code §
4-1321.01; Fla. Stat. § 39.001(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-)-
5(a); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-
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It is the intent of the legisla-
ture that, as a result of these
reports, protective services will
be made available in an effort
to (1) prevent further harm to
the child; (2) safeguard and en-
hance the general well-being
of children in this state; and (3)
preserve family life unless that
effort is likely to result in phys-
ical or emotional damage to the
child."
Similar to Alaska, many states are con-
cerned with the integrity of family life in ad-
dition to their efforts to protect physically or
mentally maltreated children." To satisfy this
purpose, some states explicitly stress rehabili-
tation rather than prosecution. 5
Even though approximately eleven
states in the second category announce that-
in addition to their intent to protect abused
children-it is their legislative intent to "en-
courage the cooperation of state law enforce-
ment officials" and to "provide effective child
services to quickly investigate reports of child
abuse or neglect" by requiring reporting of
a suspected child abuse case, none of these
eleven states explicitly declare prosecution as
1-1; Md. Fam. Law § 5-702; Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. §
722 Note; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.115; Mont. Code Ann.§ 41-3-101; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-3; N.Y. Soc. Serv.
Law § 411; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-301; N.D. Cent. Code, §
50-25.1-01; Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102; Or. Rev. Stat.§ 419B.007; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302; S.C. Code Ann. §
63-7-10; Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-401; Vt. Ann. Stat. tit.
33, § 4911;WVa. Code § 49-6A-1.
8 Alaska Stat. § 47.17.010.
* See Code Ann. § 12-18-102; D.C. Code § 4-1321.01;
Fla. Stat. § 39.001(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-5(a); 325 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/2(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-1-1; Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. § 722 Note; Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-
101; Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.007; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302;
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-401; WVa. Code § 49-6A-1.
" See Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-1-1; Pa. Cons. Stat. §
6302.
their paramount legislative intent. 6 Therefore,
these eleven state statutes cannot be read as
giving more weight to prosecution over other
concerns such as child's protection and fami-
ly rehabilitation. Indeed, the legislative intent
to facilitate investigation of the reported child
abuse is mere acknowledgment by those states
that a report may have the natural tendency to
result in prosecution of the abuse case.
Finally, while all fifty states have adopted
mandatory reporting statute, there are six re-
maining states where the state legislature did
not specifically pronounce its policy behind
the obligatory reporting provision. Nonethe-
less, despite the lack of a stated legislative pur-
pose provision, their intent can be implicitly
deduced by the plain language of their man-
datory reporting provisions. For instance, the
United States District Court for the District
of Nevada held that "[t]he plain and unambig-
uous language of [the mandatory reporting
provision] along with the underlying statutory
86 Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-102; Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-
1-1; see also Md. Fam. Law § 5-702; Mich. Comp. Laws
Serv. § 722 Note; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.115; N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 411; Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302; Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-4a-401; Vt. Ann. Stat. Tit. 33, § 4911;W Va. Code§ 49-6A-1. See generally N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-1-2,
1-3, 4-3. In New Mexico, the duty to report child abuse
provision is included in the Child Abuse and Neglect
Act, which is Article 4 of the Children's Code. Although
the Child Abuse and Neglect Act itself does not contain
its legislative policy, the Children's Code has the Chil-
dren's Code General Provisions Act placed in Article 1
of the Children's Code that generally applies to every
Article in the Children's Code "unless the context oth-
erwise requires."Id. § 32A-1-2. Two of eight legislative
purposes of the Children's Code General Provisions Act
are "to provide for the care, protection and wholesome
mental and physical development of children" and "to
provide for the cooperation of coordination of the civil
and criminal systems for investigation ... to achieve the
best interests of a child victim." Id. § 32A- 1-3.
83 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3620; Haw. Rev. Stat. §
350-1.1; Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-353; Nev. Rev. Stat. §
432B.220; Tex. Fam. Code § 261.101; Va. Code Ann. §
63.2-1500.
Washington College of Law 69Spring 2016
9
Kim: <em>Ohio v. Clark</em>: The Primary Purpose of the Mandatory Repo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
Criminal Law Practitioner
schemes, indicates that these sections are de-
signed to protect children from abuse and ne-
glect by reporting instances of such conduct.""
In summation, under the primary pur-
pose test, the inquiry must take into account
all of the relevant circumstances that should be
deemed objectively." If a teacher, or any per-
sons who have been identified by state law to
have a duty to report suspected abuse, acted
in a way pursuant to mandatory reporting law,
the primary purpose of the teacher's inquiry
must be viewed objectively. A court must look
at the very statute which mandates the teacher
to question her student and to report the pos-
sible abuse to appropriate authorities since the
legislative intent of the mandatory reporting
statute is the teacher's primary purpose of her
fulfilling the duty from the objective viewpoint.
Therefore, in the first category, it is ap-
parent that the reporter's paramount concern is
to protect a child whose safety and welfare may
be adversely affected by abuse and neglect. 0
In the second category, the reporter's principle
intent is to protect the child unless the context
otherwise indicates she acted for the different
purposes of the statute." Finally, in the third
category of six states, the legislative intent can
be implied by the plain and unambiguous lan-
guages of the statute, and the primary purpose
of the reporter can also be presumed by the
implied legislative policy unless the context in-
dicates differently otherwise.92
" Doe v. State, State Dep't of Educ., No.
02:03CV0150OLRHRJJ, 2006 WL 2583746, at *5 (D. Nev.
Sept. 7, 2006).
9 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (citation omitted).
* See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
4. THE DECLARANT'S AGE AS A
CRUCIAL FACTOR UNDER THE
PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST
The United States Supreme Court's
consideration of L.P.'s age in its opinion is sig-
nificant in that lower courts and states' highest
courts have long been split as to how to ad-
dress hearsay statements given by a very young
child, like L.P." Some courts have held that a
declarant's age is pertinent under the primary
purpose test because the declarant's age is one
9 Compare Com. v. Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d 163
(2012) (holding that a four-year-old declarant's state-
ments to the children and youth services caseworker
and psychologist were not testimonial; among other
circumstances, a declarant's age is a pertinent charac-
teristic for analysis), State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 264
P3d 461 (2011) (holding that a four-year-old declarant's
statements in response to the sexual assault nurse
examiner's inquiry about what happened were not tes-
timonial, for Confrontation Clause purposes, under the
objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances
because these circumstances include the victim's age),
People v. Stechliy, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 302, 870 N.E.2d 333
(2007) (holding that a five-year-old declarant's state-
ments to her mother concerning defendant's sexual
abuse were not testimonial under the primary purpose
test because among other reasons, she would not have
anticipated the statement being used in prosecution),
and Com. v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 65, 849 N.E.2d 218
(2006) (holding that a six-year-old declarant's statement
to an emergency room physician did not indicate that a
reasonable person in the victim's position would have
anticipated use of her statements against the abuser in
prosecution; the victim's lack of knowledge or sophis-
tication is attributed to her young age), with State v.
Siler, 116 Ohio St.3d 39, 876 N.E.2d 534, 544 (holding
that a three-year-old declarant's statements made in
the course of police interrogation were testimonial;
"the age of a declarant is not determinative of whether
a testimonial statement has been made during a police
interrogation"), People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 n. 8
(Colo. 2006) (holding that a seven-year-old declarant's
statement made to "a government agent as part of a
police interrogation . . . is testimonial irrespective of the
child's expectations regarding whether the statement
will be available for use at a later trial[]"), and State v.
Mack, 337 Ore. 586, 588 (Or. 2004) (holding that the
victim's three-year-old brother's statement to a social
worker is testimonial and subject to the Confrontation
Clause).
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of the circumstantial factors which determines
if a statement is testimonial while others have
not even bothered to consider the declarant's
age, as did the Supreme Court of Ohio.9'
Generally, in the current legal system,
if a very young child makes a statement to an
authority figure depicting a criminal activity
against an accused at trial then the result is
one of the following: (1) the child may testify
at trial;" (2) evidence of the child's statement
may not be introduced at trial;16 or (3) the evi-
dence may be admitted as an exception of the
hearsay rule." On the other hand, if adults had
made the similar statement in a similar situa-
tion, it is rather a simple result. Given that they
would appreciate gravity of their conduct and,
either consciously or unconsciously, intend to
establish some facts potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution, that statement would be
used in a prosecution of the accused assuming
that they testify at trial." If they do not appear
before the court, their hearsay statement is like-
ly to be excluded pursuant to the Confronta-
tion Clause upon a finding that it is testimonial.
Because all the circumstances have to be
examined in an objective manner, a declarant's
age should not be precluded in court's analysis
especially in a case where the declarant is very
9 See Compare Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d 163.
9 See, e.g., State v. Cochran, 2004 ME 138 (Me. 2004)
(holding that a five-year-old witness was competent to
be a witness under ME. R. EVID. 601(b)).
" See, e.g., State v. Mack, 337 Ore. 586 (Or. 2004)
(holding that because a three-year-old witness was not
competent to be a witness at trial, and his hearsay state-
ments were testimonial, the evidence should be exclud-
ed).
9 See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W2d 243 (Minn.
2006) (finding that a three-year-old child victim's state-
ments to child protection worker during risk-assess-
ment interview were not testimonial and thus admissi-
ble).
9 Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, Sympo-
siumn, The Child Quasi Witness, 82 U. CHI. L. BEV. 89, 90
(2015).
young." The Court's decision in Ohio v. Clark -
looking at a victim's age-renders itself consis-
tent with its precedent, Michigan v. Bryant, clar-
ifying the need of objective assessment to take
all of the circumstances into consideration.o10
This approach is also harmonious with social
science research.101
Since 1980s, a small but growing num-
bers of scholars have conducted research to
examine a child's understanding of the le-
gal system. 102 Typically, the research has been
motivated by the need of understanding chil-
dren's knowledge of their rights in dependency
court 0s and their competency to stand at tri-
al as a witness.10 Results of this research can
be nonetheless read broadly to encompass the
present issue whether a child's statement con-
cerning a criminal activity made to a non-law
enforcement individual would be considered
to be testimonial. This approach is appropri-
ate because the primary purpose test inquires
" See Allshouse, 614 Pa. 229, 36 A.3d at 181.
'0 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369.
'01 See infra text accompanying notes 102-21.
102 Alexia Cooper, Allison R. Wallin, Jodi A. Quas, &
Thomas D. Lyon, Maltreated and Nonmaltreated Chil-
dren's Knowledge of the Juvenile Dependency Court System,
14(3) CHILD MALTREATMENT 255, 255 (2010).
10 See generally Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
("A court having jurisdiction over matters involving
abused and neglected children, foster care, the termina-
tion of parental rights, and (sometimes) adoption.").
104 See Cooper et al., supra note 102, at 255, 258 (stating
that research of children's understanding of legal sys-
tem is important because "a lack of knowledge predicts
increased distress and perceptions of unfairness of the
legal system which not only lead the children to be vul-
nerable in proceedings but also make them have neg-
ative attitude toward the legal system"); Rhona H. Flin,
Yvonne Stevenson, & Graham M. Davies, Children's
Knowledge of Court Proceedings, 80 BIUTISH J. PSYCHOL.
285, 285 (1989) (stating that "[t]he role of child witnesses
in criminal prosecutions and the appropriateness of the
legal procedures for gathering and testing their evi-
dence have become a matter of intense public concern"
because children who have witnessed a criminal activity
or were a victim of physical or sexual abuse may be
involved in such court proceedings).
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if the young declarants' statements were made
to "establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.""o' In
other words, the primary purpose test asks if
the young declarants know the consequences
of their statements. In order to answer this, one
must first ask if they comprehend the legal sys-
tem.
Numerous studies, not surprisingly,
have revealed that the younger children are,
the less understanding of the legal system
they have. In these studies, children appear to
have little knowledge of the roles and respon-
sibilities of legal professionals.1" For instance,
some researchers conducted a study where
they asked eighty-five children aged from sev-
en to ten various questions about the roles of
key professionals in legal proceedings.10 The
questionnaire included items such as "What
does a judge do?" and "What does a social
worker do?" 0 In the study, age was one of six
"1 Davis v.Washington, 547 U.S at 822.
'1 See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 104, at 255, 258
(describing research about age differences in maltreated
and nonmaltreated children's knowledge of juvenile de-
pendency court vocabulary and proceedings in a study
involving young participants whose ages were between
four and fourteen); Flin et al., supra note 104 at 285, 285
(stating that the study included young children aged six,
eight, ten years old, and adults, all of whom were exam-
ined by researchers about their knowledge of criminal
court procedures and legal vocabulary).
'1 Stephanie D. Block et. Al., Abused andNeglected Chil-
dren in Court: Knowledge andAttitudes, 34 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT (2010) 559 (noting that the objective of their
study was to assess maltreated children's understand-
ing and attitudes about their court experiences). This
study was conducted immediately after the participants
attended their dependency court hearings. Although
this research focused on the group of children who
already had some experience of the court proceeding, it
also examined the participant's age difference in under-
standing the legal system. This study is worth mention
here because children's age difference has a strong
correlation with their knowledge of the legal system,
regardless of their previous exposure to it.
"o Block et al., supra note 106, at 669 app.
variables-age, abuse type, ethnicity, referred
to criminal court, participation, anxiety-that
the researchers considered as possible predic-
tors of the participants' knowledge of the court
system.10 The results revealed that "knowl-
edge was significantly predicted only by age"
and "increased linearly with increasing age."no
The researchers also noted that the remaining
variables were not significantly associated with
children's knowledge "once the effect of age
was estimated.""'
This finding may be attributed to chil-
dren's limited exposure to legal language. 112
Some linguists noted that children's compre-
hension of legal terminology is not "an all-or-
nothing procedure, but, rather a protracted
process."" The linguists conducted a study
to examine children's understanding of legal
terms including "burglary," "police officer," "ar-
rest," "judge," "criminal," "prosecution," "law,"
guilty," and "social workers."" The young par-
ticipants were divided into four age-groups:
five, seven, eight, and ten."' Results of the
study indicated that while more than a half of
each group understood meanings of "burglary,"
"police officer" and "criminal," none of them
could define "prosecution.""' More interesting
findings of the study were their own primitive
definitions of the legal terms offered by the
participants: "A court is a sort of jail," "[a judge
is] someone who gets money, like at a pet show,"
and "[arrest] means you're lying down.""
109 See Block et al., supra note 106, at 664.
110 Block et al., supra note 106, at 664 (emphasis added).
1I Block et al., supra note 106, at 664.
112 See Block et al., supra note 106, at 660.
11 Michelle Aldridge, Kathryn Timmins, & Joanne
Wood, Children's Understanding ofLegal Terminology:
Judges Get Money atPet Shows, Don't They?, 6 CHILD
ABUSE REV. 141, 141 (1997).
n1 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142.
n" Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142.
"6 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 142-43.
n1 Aldridge et al., supra note 112, at 144-45.
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Considering the outcomes of the study,
it is nearly impossible to conclude that young
children have the same mindset as that of adults
when they describe a criminal activity to some-
one."' These results are not unique in children
who are raised in the United States; it is rather
a universal phenomenon across the world and
is likely due to children's incomplete cognitive
development.11
There is a biological explanation for
this finding.12 0 The prefrontal cortex of the
brain, which governs "so-called executive
functions such as monitoring, planning, and
impulse control," is not fully developed until
late adolescence.1 2 1 This deficit affects "a web
u1 See generally Karen Saywitz, Carol Jaenicke, & Lorin-
da Camparo, Children's Knowledge ofLegal Terminology,
14 Law & Hum. Behav. 523 (1990) (explaining that the
study assessed children's "age-related patterns in com-
municative ability relevant to providing testimony" and
tested "knowledge of legal terms commonly used with
children in court." Sixty participants were divided into
three groups for which the mean ages were five, eight,
and eleven, respectively. The researchers used a list of
thirty-five legal terms, including "evidence," "testify,"
"attorney," "jury," and "oath," to evaluate the partici-
pant's understanding. The study revealed that there was
"a significant [age]-related effect).
"' See, e.g., Anna Emilia Berti & Elisa Ugolini, Develop-
ing Knowledge of the Judicial System: A Domain-Specific
Approach, 159(2) J. of Genetic Psychology 211 (1998)
(concluding that Italian children's knowledge of the
court system, including roles of judges, lawyers, wit-
nesses and the jury, improves with increasing age.
First graders showed poor knowledge whereas eighth
graders revealed better understanding); Michele Peter-
son-Bradali, Rona Abramovitch, & Juiane Duda, Young
children's legal knowledge and reasoning ability, 39 Cana-
dian J. Criminology 145, 162 (1997) (describing that "[w]
hile ... overall lack of legal knowledge generally applied
to both the Canadian younger and the older children in
the present study, the older participants did possess a
somewhat better sense" than the younger ones).
120 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97.
121 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97. See gen-
erally Monica Luciana & Charles A. Nelson, The Func-
tional Emergence ofPrefrontally- Guided Working Memory
System in Four- to Eight- Year- Old Children, 36 Neuropsy-
chologia 273 (1998).
of interrelated psychological abilities that are
involved in understanding the mental states of
others as well as the effects that one's own ac-
tions and statements have on others." 122 Stated
differently, a combination of young children's
lack of understanding of the legal system with
their not-yet- fully- developed pre-frontal cortex
of the brain renders them vulnerable in inter-
acting with others, especially in a situation like
Clark v. Ohio. For instance, when engaging in an
interview with L.P., although the teacher might
have intended to establish facts for a later pros-
ecution of the abuser, it is highly likely that not
only is L.P. incapable of appreciating or even
imagining why the teacher wanted to know
what happened to him, but also he was unable
to consider the significance of his statements
against Clark. Indeed, from the true objective
perspective based on social science research,
very young children lack capacity to offer tes-
timonial statements under the Confrontation
Clause.
At least two unsolved problems-con-
cerning the Court's ruling on the issue of L.P.'s
age remain here. First, while the Court found
it "extremely unlikely" that a child declarant at
the age of three intended his statement to be
used for trial testimony,123 it did not provide a
bright-line rule as to at what age should a mi-
nor's statement be deemed testimonial and
thus subject to the Confrontation Clause. 2 1
Like L.P., there is a group of very immature
children who are generally considered to lack
an understanding of the gravity of their state-
ment describing a criminal activity. It is hard to
imagine that they intend their statement to be
used at trial. On the other hand, there is anoth-
er group of children who are likely to appreci-
ate the legal system and thus may understand
122 See Friedman & Ceci, supra note 98, at 97-98.
123 Ohio v. Clark 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
124 See id
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the significance of their statement implicating
the accused with a criminal activity. However,
due to the existence of a gray area between the
two groups and various factors affecting indi-
viduals' knowledge and understanding of the
criminal justice system, it seems rather illegiti-
mate to draw a bright-line between the groups
and presuppose a group of children younger
than a particular age is either capable or inca-
pable of making a testimonial statement.
A possible solution to this problem
does not depend on a sole endeavor made by
the legal system. Law practitioners and legal
scholars must look to results and implications
of social science research and derive benefits
from their work. And social science researchers
must study not only children's understanding
of legal vocabulary and court system (indirect
way) but also children witnesses' understand-
ing of the consequence of their statements (di-
rect way).
The second unsolved question is why
out-of-court statements made by an incompe-
tent witness can be introduced into evidence.
Here, L.P. was ruled incompetent to testify be-
cause of his age.125 The trial court found that L.P.
appeared incapable of differentiating between
truth and falsity."I In other words, L.P. was con-
sidered too unreliable to testify in court. But
the Court held that L.P's hearsay statements
were not testimonial and thus should be ad-
mitted at trial.127 One of the disturbing aspects
of the case is that Clark was convicted based on
the hearsay statements of L.P. who was statuto-
rily incompetent to testify at trial.
One possible way to reconcile this dis-
crepancy necessitates a review of the Craw-
125 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 2183.
ford case where the Court declared that the
Confrontation Clause's fundamental aim is to
"ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a pro-
cedural rather than a substantive guarantee."12 8
As aforementioned, not every out-of-court
statement is open to being challenged under
the Confrontation Clause; rather, the proce-
dural protection against hearsay statements is
against testimonial statements made against
the accused. Provided that the totality of the
circumstances shows the challenged statement
is not testimonial, like in Ohio v. Clark, there is
no confrontation problem so far as the Sixth
Amendment is concerned.
This unsolved issue illustrated in the
Clark case is not solely related to the Confron-
tation Clause, but it is in fact one of the classic
concerns of hearsay exceptions: choice between
exclusion of unreliable evidence and inclusion
of imperfect evidence. All evidence is imper-
fect to some extent. Generally out-of-court
statements are not admissible because they are
neither subject to cross-examination nor made
under oath. Further, they raise credibility, accu-
racy, and confrontation concerns. Nonetheless,
some hearsay statements are admissible as long
as they are relevant, and the statement's pro-
bative value is not substantially outweighed by
a danger of unfair prejudice. 1 29 Once admitted,
the substantive reliability and credibility of the
evidence must be decided by the trier of fact.
Therefore, although the Ohio statute deemed
L.P. incompetent due to his age and considered
him unreliable to testify in court, the reliability
of his out-of-court statement made in his daily
life-different from the court setting-must be
addressed by the jury. This answer to the sec-
ond question appears to be consistent with the
Court's position.
128 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 61 (emphasis
added)
129 See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
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5. CONCLUSION
In Clark v. Ohio, the United States Su-
preme Court finally addressed the issue of
a statement provided to individuals who are
not law enforcement officers and considered
a declarant's age to support its holding of the
non-testimonial nature of L.P.'s statements. 1s0
As to the first issue, the Court disagreed
with the Supreme Court of Ohio's finding that
the teacher's mandatory reporting duty made
them act as agents of the state law enforcement,
and stated that "mandatory reporting statutes
alone cannot convert a conversation between a
concerned teacher and her student into com-
munication aimed primarily at gathering evi-
dence for a prosecution."" Although the Court
declined to adopt a categorical rule on this mat-
ter, the legislative scheme of the relevant stat-
ute must be considered, especially when the
statute provides the sole legislative purpose. 132
This approach-looking to the legisla-
tive intent of the statute - is consistent with
the Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz."13 None-
theless, the legislature's declaration of policy
must not be treated as a dispositive factor in
determining what the reporter's purpose was
in questioning a child. As suggested above, it
should be considered as one of all the relevant
'10 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181-82.
131 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
132 See id. at 2182.
133 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009).
factors including, but not limited to, the identi-
ty of the person who asked the declarant ques-
tions, and "the content and tenor of his [or her]
questions[.]""' Thus, if the content and tenor
of the teacher's questions along with the other
relevant circumstances-the legislative scheme
of the statute- demonstrate that the primary
purpose of the teacher's inquiries was to estab-
lish or prove past events, the trier of fact could
objectively find that the teacher's primary pur-
pose was prosecution-acting as an agent of
law enforcement-and not protection.
Concerning the declarant's age, the
Court explicitly stated that statements made by
very young children like L.E will hardly ever im-
plicate the Confrontation Clause."' The Court
not only acknowledged the implications of re-
search on children's understanding of the judi-
cial system but also found that it is "extremely
unlikely" that a three-year-old child would ever
intend his statement to be used for trial tes-
timony.1 16 As stated above, young children do
not have the cognitive capacity that adults have.
Therefore, unless the context shows differently,
a very young child's statement should not be
considered to have testimonial nature due to
the very reason that the Court mentioned.
I3 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (stating that
"'the identity of an interrogator, and the content and
tenor of his questions,' can illuminate the 'primary pur-
pose of the interrogation[]"').
135 Ohio v. Clark 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
136 Id.
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